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ARTICLES
TOWARDS A FEDERAL FIDUCIARY STANDARDS ACT
MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
V IEWED FROM A DISTANCE, THERE IS SOMETHING SURPRISING about the
fact that the legal standards that govern the conduct of corporate
managers -directors, officers and controlling stockholders -differ in
their source and origin depending on whether one is speaking of rela-
tions with the company itself or of relations with its security holders. At
the security holder level, it is of course the federal securities statutes
that have primary effect. Federal proxy and insider trading rules,
together with federal disclosure requirements, are the prevailing con-
straints where relations between managers and investors are con-
cerned. At the company level, by contrast, it is the statutory and com-
mon law of the state of incorporation that chiefly governs. Fiduciary
limitations on dealings between the company and those who manage or
control the disposition of its property have long been reserved to the
states, of which Delaware, being the principal state of incorporation, is
the most important. In effect, then, despite the economic identity that
exists between the firm and its security holders, fiduciary obligation is
at present dichotomized between federal and state legal systems which
have no very close connection to one another; the federal system
dominates the security holder level while the various state systems
dominate at the firm level.
The reason for the dichotomy just described is in part historical. The
common law of fraud and deceit-with its requirements of privity,
reliance, and so on-was, or was thought to be, too restrictive to cope
with problems of false disclosure or nondisclosure in transactions taking
place on an impersonal stock exchange between anonymous parties.1
Both the 1933 Act,2 with its registration requirement and its broadened
framework of liability, and the insider trading and proxy rules of the
1934 Act,3 were responsive to the need to adapt the law of fraud and
*William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University. Portions of
this article are drawn from an unpublished paper delivered by the author at a
conference on corporate governance sponsored by the American Enterprise In-
stitute.
L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 20 (2d ed. 1961).
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1976).
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deceit to contemporary conditions. These statutes obviously had to be
national in scope-state blue-sky laws, like state antitrust laws, would
never have been adequate to the task of policing and constraining the is-
suance and trading of securities on national stock exchanges.
But there was no such perception in New Deal days of the need for na-
tional fiduciary standards, except to some extent in the case of insolv-
ency reorganizations and public utility holding companies. The relation-
ship between the corporation itself and its managers or in-
siders-though of course constrained by fiduciary obligation-was
thought properly left to state law. Insolvencies and public utilities aside,
the problems involved were apparently not felt to be especially serious
or perhaps were somehow viewed as local in character because they did
not entail trading on a securities exchange. Whatever the reasons, the
Supreme Court in the recent Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green' case
was almost certainly correct in holding that rule Ob- 5 was not designed
to provide a foundation for the erection of federal fiduciary standards,
and in confirming that fiduciary rules remained a matter of state law. In
the same spirit, many commentators questioned what appeared to be an
attempt by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to use the
federal disclosure requirements to create substantive fairness stand-
ards in the going-private area, and the Commission, apparently
recognizing the force of those criticisms, substantially moderated its
position in its final regulations.' The essential point of the Santa Fe deci-
sion is clear, after all-disclosure rules are not to be converted into a
federal law of fiduciary duty without congressional action, and until
there is such action, state law governs.
The question now is whether Congress should act in the field of
managerial conduct, or whether state law should be allowed to retain its
preeminence. As is well known, many writers hold the view that the
time has indeed come for legislation at the federal level on fiduciary
responsibility and related problems.' A subcommittee of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, chaired by Senator Metzenbaum, has introduced a
bill on the subject,' and Professor Cary's influential article9 on the need
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
' SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
8 Compare Rule 13e-3, 44 Fed. Reg. 46,736, 46,471 (1979) with Proposed
Rule-Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, 42
Fed. Reg. 60,090, 60,101 (1977).
7 E.g., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Henning, Federal Corporate Chartering for Big Business:
An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 915 (1972); Schwartz,
Towards New Corporate Goals: Co-existance with Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 57 (1971).
8 Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980, S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(April 16, 1980).
" Cary, supra note 7.
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for a federal minimum standards act, though far from commanding
universal assent, continues to be discussed by both scholars and practi-
tioners.
The position argued for in this article is favorable to the idea of
federal legislation, but my approach, in the main, is more instrumental
than philosophic. It seems clear to me that the fiduciary problems of ma-
jor interest are problems that can only be solved legislatively, and that
the appropriate solutions are both specific and various. No single and no
general solution will handle all the problems that arise. Put differently,
the evolution of a common law "fairness" standard is inadequate to the
task of actually achieving fairness-a conclusion that somewhat
resembles the one that inspired those who drafted the securities laws of
the 1930's. While it is possible that such specific solutions might be left
for the states to adopt, the case for uniformity and certainty becomes
overwhelming once we know just what it is we want to do. If we think
we have the answers, or can get them, then it is very hard to see why
legal standards that would affect national corporations with national in-
vestor constituencies should not be national in application. The "state
laboratory" concept may be valid to some extent, but the metaphor
itself implies that experimentation will some day come to an end.
In Part II, next following, I try-using the freezeout of minority
shareholders as my main illustration-to develop the idea of specific
solutions for fiduciary problems and to show why nothing short of
legislative action will meet the current need. In Part III, I argue the
case for federal legislation a bit further, and I offer some suggestions
about the administration of the federal statute that might emerge and
the role of the SEC. My conclusion, overall, is that the adoption of a
federal fiduciary standards act would be a progressive development in
the field of company law, and that the time to begin working on the
shape and substance of such a statute is now.
II. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION
I think it would be agreed by many that the urgent concerns that in-
spired the federal investor protection laws of the 1930's have a near
counterpart at the present time in the phenomenon of the takeover.
Mergers, stock swaps, cash tender offers and other forms of corporate
acquisition-far more than stock flotations-have become central to the
corporate practice and now substantially engage the attention of
lawyers, courts, administrators and investors. The legal problems that
have arisen out of the takeover movement are almost too numerous to
catalogue, but for the immediate purpose of this discussion-which, as I
have said, is to illustrate the need for uniform statutory solutions to
fiduciary problems-it is the so-called minority stockholder freezeout
that I wish to highlight. The Santa Fe case is a good example. There, a
parent corporation owned ninety-five percent of an operating sub-
1981]
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sidiary, with the balance of the subsidiary's shares being held in small
lots by public stockholders. Wanting to eliminate the minority interest,
the parent, on its own motion, merged the subsidiary into itself under
the Delaware short-form merger statute and paid off the public
stockholders in cash at a price that it had previously determined to be
fair. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held this freezeout merger to
be a fraudulent practice within the meaning of rule 10b-5,11 but the
Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the 1934 Act was solely
concerned with disclosure, which was conceded to have been adequate
and complete." Issues of fairness and fiduciary responsibility, said the
Court, were not properly raised under the federal statute, but were in-
stead to be resolved by state law. Towards the end of his opinion
Justice White virtually invited Congress to take notice of the freezeout
problem;12 until it did, however, the question remained a matter for
state jurisprudence to grapple with.
To be sure, freezeouts are only one part of a much larger legal scene;
yet it is accurate, I think, to say that the treatment of minority
shareholders-in mergers is a major subject for stockholder suits at the
present time, and that it is almost impossible to achieve a freezeout
without a court contest, actual or threatened. This may sound all to the
good since the term "freezeout" has a pejorative ring, but, as I hope to
show, the fact is that some-perhaps most-freezeouts are actually
useful features of bona fide takeover transactions and often function as
a necessary element in a business acquisition. On the one hand (in my
view), there is far too much litigation over the rights of minority
stockholders in this context; on the other hand (also in my view), the
results that are reached in the decided cases are often wrong or at least
inadequately explained by the courts. One has the impression that the
freezeout problem is too actively litigated at present, or to put it dif-
ferently, that the litigation that is going on at such a great rate is not
resolving anything, and is not producing rules of general application
which lawyers can use effectively in planning legitimate transactions.
As a body of doctrine, the field appears to be disintegrating rather than
coming together-much to the profit of one section of the bar, to be
sure, but with a correspondingly heavy cost to everyone else.
Why is there such a chaotic legal structure, and why such uncer-
tainty? The answer, at least in part, is that the prevailing common law
principles of fiduciary duty-chiefly "fairness" and "business
purpose"-are too weak, too clumsy and ill-focused to cope with the
complexities and subtleties of a case like Santa Fe. It is not enough,
quite obviously, to say that managers and controlling stockholders have
10 Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976).
" Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
12 Id. at 479.
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a fiduciary duty to the public stockholders. This only begins the
analysis, as Justice Frankfurter observed; 3 the hard question is just
what concrete legal obligations the fiduciary should be asked to meet.
The answer, at present, is altogether uncertain, deriving as it does from
the common law as developed in the state courts, or perhaps common
law buttressed by some vague statutory extrapolation. One goes from
case to case (and it is best, I think, to read these cases with one's eyes
half closed) searching for doctrine. The process is that curious inferen-
tial one that we all become familiar with in law school when, reading the
old-time torts and contracts cases, we try our best to locate the rules of
decision by slightly altering the fact patterns or by speculating about
the court's "true intent." This is a process we know and love, but
whatever its values elsewhere, I do not think it works well in resolving
issues of high finance.
The courts have made an effort to give content to fiduciary duty in
the field of freezeouts by emphasizing a requirement of "fairness." To
be accepted or tolerated as a legitimate use of majority power in dealing
with a minority, the deal must be shown (the burden being on the
defendant-proponent) to be "fair" to the corporation's public
stockholders. 4 Prompted, perhaps, by Justice White's observations in
Santa Fe, the Delaware court has recently added to the fairness re-
quirements a further condition, namely, that the freezeout have a
demonstrable "business purpose," meaning, presumably, a commercial
justification over and above the mere elimination of the minority
stockholders. 5 Fairness and business purpose, then, represent the affir-
mative content of fiduciary duty with respect to freezeout transactions,
and it is to be said in advance that the Delaware courts have, on a few
recent occasions, struck down several merger transactions on the
ground that these criteria of legitimacy had not been met. 6
From my standpoint, however, the complaint is not the one that Pro-
fessor Cary and others have made over the years, namely, that the state
courts (Delaware especially) have been inattentive to minority interests
and have allowed majorities to run roughshod over the rights of the
public stockholders. This may be true, but I find it hard to be very clear
in particular cases that the minority is entitled to anything beyond fair
treatment. Fairness evidently refers to price. But price of what? What
are the property interests that belong to the minority in the first
place-what is it that the law recognizes to be theirs? That this ques-
SEC v. Chenery, 322 U.S. 194 (1947).
" See Tanzer v. Int'l General Industries, Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. Ch. 1979);
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 20, 89 A.2d 862 (Del. 1952).
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
16 E.g., Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979); Tanzer v. Int'l
General Industries, Inc., 402 A.2d 382 (Del. 1979).
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tion of entitlement can be a difficult one will be evident if one thinks
back to the early development of Chapter X of the National Bankruptcy
Act; 7 it was very much an open question-until the Supreme Court
resolved it"8 -whether the "fairness" requirement in Chapter X meant
that senior security holders in an insolvency reorganization could be
paid off with new securities having a value less than the face amount of
their old claims, whether they could be asked to engage in a little give-
and-take with the juniors, or whether "fair" meant that the seniors had
to be compensated in full before juniors would be allowed to participate
in the reorganized firm. The Court resolved this issue in favor of ab-
solute priority for seniors, but until it did there was great uncertainty
about what the seniors really owned in the way of "property" and hence
what price would, as a, matter of theory, be considered fair. 9 Congress
has recently acted to overthrow the absolute priority stand-
ardl- seniors can now accept less than full face amount if a majority of
their class consents, so that the rule of give-and-take is once again ac-
ceptable. The obvious point is that "fairness," even taken to refer solely
to price and excluding other possible elements, very much depends on
what the law regards the affected party as owning to begin with. There
is nothing self-evident about this. Entitlements need to be defined
before they can be compensated and, if a definition is lacking, then what
is "fair" cannot be known.
Just as there was for a time under old Chapter X, there is uncertainty
now about entitlements in the freezeout field. Take the Santa Fe situa-
tion as an illustration once again. A parent owns ninety-five percent
(95%) of the stock of a subsidiary and acts to eliminate the minority by
paying them cash-in this instance $150 a share-for their stock. Was
$150 fair? Delaware law holds the price to be fair if and only if it is equal
to what the minority stockholders would have received in an arm's
length deal with the majority. This sounds all right, but a moment's
thought suggests a good many ambiguities. Thus, who are the presumed
parties to this hypothetical arm's length transaction? The parent cor-
poration is clearly on one side, but who is on the other? Is it the minor-
ity stockholders acting one by one, limited as to information and limited
also in their willingness to incur costs and engage in prolonged bargain-
ing? Or is it the minority as a group acting as if they were represented
by bargaining agents just as skilled and knowledgeable as those who
represent the parent? One could easily imagine that a different "arm's
length price" would emerge if the minority were regarded as "union-
ized" than if they were viewed as scattered and relatively powerless.
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1979).
" Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DaBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
" See, e.g., In re Atlas Pipeline Corp., 39 F. Supp. 846 (D.C. La. 1941).
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1979).
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Other ambiguities can be mentioned. Given the statutory power of
the majority to eliminate and in other ways to disfavor the minority,
might it not be expected that the value of the public shares would fall to
a discount once majority control had been acquired by the parent? Is it
"fair" to reflect this discount in the price ultimately paid in the
freezeout, or should the minority shares be priced as if there were no
controlling majority? There is a type of circularity about this question
that makes it hard to deal with. To its credit (or blame), the Delaware
court in the past has sought to break out of the circle by stating frankly
that since minority stockholders have got to expect a certain amount of
oppression from the majority, their stock should be discounted accord-
ingly."' It is, perhaps, not likely that the same bald assertion would be
made today, but that really does not mean that it was wrong, then or
now.
Perhaps not always, but at least sometimes, the merger of an
operating subsidiary into its parent results in a higher overall value for
the combined entity than the sum of the values of the parent and sub-
sidiary as separate corporations, as illustrated by Santa Fe. Stock
market multipliers, operating economies or tax savings may in a given in-
stance result in synergy, with a more valuable economic aggregate ac-
tually emerging by reason of the act of combination. Perhaps this would
be an example of the "business purpose" on which the Delaware court
now insists. But in any event, who gets the increase? How is it shared?
Do minority stockholders have a claim, and if so, to how much? The
Delaware courts have rejected the argument that there should be a divi-
sion of synergistic gains between parent and minority;' on the other
hand, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that any post-
merger appreciation must be divided so as to produce an equal percent-
age return for the stockholders of both corporations."3 Who is right?
Once again, the question is one of how "property" is defined and of what
ownership rights are said to attach to the minority (or majority) shares
to begin with. As might be expected, the issue has been debated in the
law reviews. 4 I doubt, however, whether this and other aspects of the
fairness question will ever be resolved satisfactorily by courts operating
under the constraints of precedent. My doubt is supported, as I have
said, by the observable fact that the litigation over freezeouts rages on
21 Greene & Co. v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. 1977).
Tanzer v. Int'l General Industries, Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. Ch. 1979).
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 922 (1977).
2 See Brudney and Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and
Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974). See also Lorne, A Reappraisal of Fair
Shares in Controlled Mergers, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1978); Deutsch, The
Mysteries of Corporate Law: A Response to Brudney and Chirestein, 88 YALE
L.J. 235 (1978).
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and on, with no indication that reliable principles have begun to emerge.
In the end, I think it altogether unlikely that the solutions to the
issues that arise will be found within the ambit of fiduciary theory at all.
And in any case, it may be that the establishment of a "fair price" for
the minority's stock is not the optimum way every freezeout case should
be decided. In effect, "fair price" may not always be the means by which
fairness can best be achieved. There are, after all, many other devices
that are known to the law for accomplishing a fair outcome - disclosure,
for example, or majority vote-and one or another or these procedures
may be deemed more practical and appropriate in a given context than
the long-standing price test. But if so-and I hope to demonstrate that it
is so-then, clearly, a legislative initiative is called for. More refined
devices-those especially that entail procedural remedies-are not
within the reach of common law development. They are likely to be too
specific and detailed for a court to create even when armed with powers
of equity, and in any event would require statutory authorization just as
the securities reforms of the 1930's did.
Though I will not win friends by drawing this analogy, it does seem to
me that many of today's fiduciary problems-those, especially, that in-
volve recapitalizations and reorganizations -are just as complex as cer-
tain of the problems that the federal income tax has had to deal with
over the years. Everyone desires the simplification of the tax law, but
there is recognition also that if we wish, as most do, to solve complex
tax problems, statutory amendment and not common law evolution is re-
quired in many instances. A great many examples can be given, but
perhaps Subchapter C itself, which contains the tax treatment of cor-
porations and shareholders, comes most readily to mind. Common law
efforts-including Eisner v. Macomber25 - to distinguish between divid-
end and nondividend distributions ultimately failed and were displaced
by statutory provisions."6 The reason for this is that the issues were
both complex and technical and were as urgent as the need for govern-
ment revenues. Looking back, the notion that those questions could
have been left to chance judicial action seems foolish, and no one now
would be likely to suggest that the system should have been allowed to
simply "evolve."
My conviction is that the same is true of many contemporary
fiduciary issues. Whatever may have been acceptable in a simpler time,
the problems of fair dealing that today beset the field of corporate
finance require a legislative effort. This is true, as I have said, because
the old principles-chiefly fair price, arm's length dealing and business
purpose-are not adequate, are too clumsy and indiscriminate. We can
do better, I think, and indeed one of the most appealing things about the
252 U.S. 189 (1920).
E.g., I.R.C. §§ 302, 305, 306.
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idea of a federal fiduciary standards act is that it would provide us with
the opportunity to actually solve problems in the way we think is right.
As I will try to show, the "right" solutions may very well vary from
problem to problem, so that the legal techniques that are relevant in
one context may not be the best in another. If we legislate, however, we
are obviously free to use more than a single means or device for
meeting difficulties, and this to me is a particularly attractive feature of
the present proposal.
I can illustrate all this by returning to the freezeout issue once again.
Really, the word should be "issues," because freezeouts are not a single
or a unitary phenomenon, although the courts-mistakenly, in my
view-often appear to suppose that all freezeouts can be lumped
together. As I have argued elsewhere, 27 these transactions are actually
amenable to a threefold classification. So classified, each type of
freezeout presents a different fairness issue, and it seems likely that
each should be dealt with differently. A simple "fair price" solu-
tion-even if we could agree on who owns what-will not work as well
as other devices that can be thought of, but these entail and would re-
quire specific legislation.
The following, then, is an effort to break freezeouts down into three
classes, and then to supply an appropriate solution for each. Having
done this, I want to add yet a fourth problem-namely, how to cope with
transactions resulting in the elimination of dividend arrearages on
preferred stock. This of course is an old-time, familiar and much-
deplored issue in the finance field; and it is a freezeout of a sort
(sometimes, in fact, accomplished through a merger).8 I include this
fourth problem not because it has so much contemporary relevance but
for the light it throws on the other three issues. It seems to me the one
area in which "fair price" is indeed the best solution, whereas the others
are better approached by less traditional means.
A. Parent-Subsidiary Mergers
One quite common setting for a freezeout transaction is that il-
lustrated by Santa Fe: A parent corporation owning a controlling in-
terest in a subsidiary decides to eliminate the publicly held minority
shares by merging the subsidiary into itself. The public stockholders are
paid off in cash or debt at a price determined by the parent to be fair. In
today's climate, as I have said, such freezeout mergers are very often
contested by someone who is prepared to argue that the price set by the
parent is far too low. Before the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in
Brudney and Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE
L.J. 1354 (1978).
28 Bove v. The Community Hotel Corp. of Newport, R.I., 105 R.I. 36, 249 A.2d
89 (1969).
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Singer v. Magnavox,' the sole test appeared to be the one just
stated-adequacy of price-with the litigating process chiefly involving
the presentation of competing views by the parties' hired financial ex-
perts. In Singer, the Delaware court added a further requirement that
the parent have a business purpose for the merger other than the mere
elimination of the minority shares."
Are these tests-fair price and business purpose-the right ones? I
strongly doubt it. As noted already, the merger of parent and sub-
sidiary may very well result in an increase in the value of the combined
entity, and it is at least arguable that the subsidiary's stockholders
should get some share of the increase. Just what share is a debatable
question, but the idea that they should be limited to the pre-merger
value of their interest-with the entire increase going to the
parent-seems quite unjustifiable. Beyond this, however, I doubt
whether a "business purpose" requirement is really as wholesome and
desirable as it sounds. The elimination of minority interests in con-
trolled subsidiaries is probably a good thing in and of itself. Allocation
of overhead costs, of tax benefits, of opportunities for growth and diver-
sification, etc., between the two entities often presents management
with hard and time-consuming choices, and especially with respect to
corporate opportunities, the fiduciary dilemma may really be impossible
to resolve even by a management that wants to meet the highest stand-
ard of fair dealing." It is not only on the occasion of a merger, but also in
many other day-to-day situations, that the parent-subsidiary relation-
ship creates conflicts and uncertainty. Indeed, merger may be the best
and only way of resolving such conflicts once and for all. Hence, I think it
can be argued that Santa Fe-type transactions are inherently
desirable-that the elimination of actual and potential fiduciary conflict
is an entirely adequate "purpose," and that no further justification need
be called for.
If you agree with these conclusions- namely, that the merger of
parents and partly owned subsidiaries is a healthy way of reducing legal
and formal complexities, but also that "fairness" requires some sort of
sharing of economic benefit between the two sets of stockholders-then
perhaps the best solution would be (a) to permit such mergers without a
showing of business purpose, but (b) to limit the form of the considera-
tion permitted to be paid to the minority to the parent's common
shares." In effect, the merger of parent and subsidiary would be treated
380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
30 Id.
3" See David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. 1968).
31 Compare the SEC's rule 13e-3(g)(2), which provides an exception from the
general disclosure requirements imposed by rule 13e-3 on going-private transac-
tions for mergers in which the public stockholders are offered an equity interest
of the same class in the acquiring parent. "The Commission believes that such
[Vol. 30:203
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as acceptable on its face, but the use of debt or cash to pay off the
minority would be prohibited. The merger would be "fair" under my
standard if the minority stock in the subsidiary were exchanged for
stock of the parent at a ratio which reflected the respective values of
the two securities prior to the announcement of the merger. The effect
would be to cause an equal sharing of post-merger benefits, if any;
valuation problems would be minimized; and the subsidiary's stock-
holders would enjoy the same tax-free treatment on the exchange as the
parent's do."
This "solution," which bears some relationship to the Second Circuit's
approach in Santa Fe, would of course override those state statutes
which expressly or impliedly permit cash-out transactions. The underly-
ing judgment that I am making is that it is improper to exclude the sub-
sidiary's stockholders from continued participation in the combined en-
tity. Hence the only permissible consideration is the parent's common
shares. At the same time, it is inherently desirable that the two sets of
stockholders be unified. Hence there is to be no additional business pur-
pose requirement. I should add that if these features were adopted, I
would eliminate appraisal rights entirely.
B. Going Private
The merger of an operating parent and subsidiary seems to me
distinguishable from so-called going private transactions of the classic
PowerMate variety. 4 Parent-subsidiary mergers are aimed at
homogenizing the public stock ownership of the enterprise by
eliminating one of two sets of public stockholders. This move seems
desirable in itself as a way of reducing conflict-of-interest problems, and
it may also produce scale-economics or other corporate level business
gains. Provided it is carried out without impairing the minority
stockholders' interests, I would make no effort to deter it. By contrast,
going-private transactions are aimed exclusively at returning the cor-
poration to a closely-held status by liquidating the publicly held shares
and leaving the inside stockholders in whole possession. A good deal has
been written and said about the alleged unfairness of going private,35
and without repeating all the arguments that have been made, I will
simply state that I entirely agree with the view that a procedure aimed
solely or primarily at forcing out the public stockholders because the in-
siders find it advantageous to increase their own percentage interest is
violative of the insiders' fiduciary obligations.
transactions are ...outside the purpose of rule 13e-3 since all holders of that
class of security are on an equal footing and are permitted to maintain an
equivalent or enhanced equity interest." SEC Release No. 16,075 (Aug. 8, 1979).
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 57-278, 1957-1 C.B. 124.
3, See Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (1975).
E.g., Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975).
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Assuming all agreed to this, the question is: what remedy? In this
area, I think, an appropriate legislative solution might be to adopt a
"best interest" test. In effect, going private-whether attempted by
tender offer or merger into a new company or both-would be en-
joinable unless shown to be in the "best interest" of the public
stockholders. This test could not be met merely by showing that there
was adequate disclosure, nor even that the tender offer or merger was
fair from the standpoint of the price paid to the public stockholders. To
sustain the transaction, its proponents would have to demonstrate that
the elimination of public stock ownership was in the best interest of the
public stock-owners themselves, that circumstances had arisen which
made public investment undesirable to the public investors. If, for ex-
ample, a company had sold its major operating divisions and was left with
a single division whose operation was too small to justify public participa-
tion, then liquidation of the public shares might be sustained as being in
the best interest of the public stockholders.
Not fairness nor disclosure by itself, therefore, but a demonstration
that public stock ownership had grown onerous to the public stock-
holders, would be required to justify the effort to return the company to
private ownership.
C. Two-Step Mergers
Yet another situation involving the elimination of a minority stock in-
terest is a business acquisition which takes place in two discrete but
related steps. 6 X Corporation desires to acquire sole ownership of Y
Corporation. Unable to arrange a consensual merger, X tenders (or
privately negotiates) for a controlling proportion of Y's shares. Having
succeeded in acquiring control, X promptly merges Y into itself or its
wholly owned subsidiary and in effect obtains one hundred percent
(100%) ownership of Y's assets. This situation obviously differs from
"going private" because the acquiring party, X, is an outsider which
evidently thinks it can do better with Y's business than the existing
management. It also differs from the merger of a parent-subsidiary
which have been separately operated for an extended period. In the lat-
ter case, as I have tried to suggest, management has an equal obligation
to the stockholders of both entities, which it is obliged to honor on the
occasion of the merger. But in a case where merger is merely the second
step in a unitary acquisition of the target company's assets, no
equivalent burden or restraint should be imposed, and the acquiring
company should be free to complete its acquisition plan by buying out
the interest of the nontendering stockholders. In effect, the transaction
should be treated the same as a straightforward asset purchase in
See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
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which approval by a majority of Y's stockholders is binding on the
minority.
In these circumstances, I would not impose a best-interest test, and I
would not limit the form of consideration to the acquiring corporation's
shares. Viewing the transaction as an asset acquisition by an outsider, I
would allow X in effect to purchase a voting majority and then follow
that purchase with an acquisition of the remaining shares for cash, if
that is the form of consideration X prefers.
There is, however, one important constraint that I would impose on
X-a constraint which follows naturally, I think, from the perception
that tender-plus merger is really equivalent to a unitary asset acquisi-
tion. Very briefly, I would require that the intention to merge be an-
nounced at the time of the tender offer, and I would further require that
the price paid in the merger be the same as (ie., no less than) the price
previously paid in the tender." All stockholders would then have re-
ceived a pro rata distribution of the sale proceeds-just as in an asset
sale followed by a liquidation-and all would have been made aware
that acceptance of the tender offer was equivalent to a disposition of the
entire company. If these requirements were met-with emphasis on the
equal price condition-I would permit the nontendering stockholders of
the target company to be forced out by the decision of a majority of
their own cohort.
D. Preferred Dividend Arrearages
A very long-standing issue in the corporate finance field is what
standard of fairness applies (if any) where the common stockholders of a
company propose a plan of recapitalization to the preferred
stockholders whose aim is the elimination of dividend arrearages on the
preferred stock.3" In some cases, perhaps, the elimination of arrearages
can be defended on the ground that the company needs new equity
capital to survive or expand. The difficult question, however, is whether
the degree of sacrifice being proposed to (really, imposed on) the prefer-
red stockholders is "fair." No fixed standard exists under Delaware or
other state law, and the outcomes in the decided cases have seriously of-
fended, and even outraged, many impartial observers. 9
Several alternative fairness tests can easily be imagined, largely
through analogy of Chapter X and other insolvency or quasi-insolvency
" See rule 13e-3(g)(1), containing similar requirements. But see Toms, Com-
pensating Shareholders Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 548
(1978).
' The best known decision on the subject is Federal United Corp. v.
Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (1940). See also Bove v. The Community
Hotel, 105 R.I. 36, 249 A.2d 89 (1969).
11 See, e.g., Dodd, Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations, 55 HARV. L. REV. 780
(1942).
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systems. The so-called investment value doctrine, which has been used
to measure the claims of senior security-holders in corporate simplifica-
tions under the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 0 is an alternative
which I myself find plausible because it appears to balance the interests
of seniors and juniors in a way that recognizes the claims of each class."
Other commentators, however, have favored the stricter absolute prior-
ity approach of Chapter X.' Still others have suggested that the ar-
rearages be treated as "funded," that is, as entitling the preferred
stockholders to receive dividends on the arrearages themselves as if the
latter represented additional preferred shares.
3
The several alternatives could certainly be debated, but from my
standpoint any one of them is superior to the present system, under
which the terms of a recapitalization plan are almost entirely within the
discretion of those who represent the common stock. In contrast to the
first three problems, the solution here is not procedural but substan-
tive. A fair price means the deal is fair. But the question of what is a fair
price is not left wholly to judicial intuition.
Looking back over the "solutions" I have proposed to these four il-
lustrative fiduciary problems, it appears that the best solution (at least
my best) is a different one in each case. The parent-subsidiary merger,
in my view, should be subject to a requirement that only common stock
(not debt or cash) be used to take out the minority shares of the sub-
sidiary. Going private might be policed by a "best interests" test under
which the transaction would be prohibited unless supported by a show-
ing that termination of public stock ownership (and not merely fairness
of price) was in the interest of the public stockholders. Two-step
mergers would be burdened with an advance disclosure and an equal
price requirement. Preferred stock arrearage recapitalizations would
have to meet a specific fair price standard, whether the investment
value standard or some other.
One may, of course, disagree with these solutions, and I am far from
denying the possibility that better answers might be fashioned with
more thought and study. My very strong hunch, though, is that when
the problems have been thought through, it will be found that concrete
and specific solutions-rather than a vaguely framed fairness test-are
desirable, and that different problems are best handled in very different
" Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z6 (1971).
" Eastern Gas & Fuel Assoc., 30 S.E.C. 834 (1950). See Note, A Standard of
Fairness for Compensating Preferred Shareholders in Corporate Recapitaliza-
tions, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 97 (1965).
42 Brudney, Standards of Fairness and the Limits of Preferred Stock
Modifications, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 445 (1973).
"3 Latty, Fairness- The Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimina-
tion, 29 VA. L. REv. 1 (1942).
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ways, sometimes by focusing on procedure, sometimes on disclosure,
sometimes on price, and so on.
All of this, I believe, points clearly to the desirability of legislation in
this area. The exercise of judicial intuition about what is fair will not
suffice, because the problems are too complicated and various to be
dealt with by common law analogizing. We need a Code of fiduciary
standards, just as we have needed a securities code, a tax code and com-
mercial code. On the dimension of complexity and variety, the problems
in all these fields are pretty nearly on a par.
III. CHARACTER OF THE STATUTE
I am aware that I have, in a sense, argued my case backwards. I have
tried to show how useful and necessary it is to have legislative solutions
to current fiduciary problems, and I have assumed, without debate, that
if we decided we wanted extensive legislation, we would naturally want
it to be at the federal level and not at the state. But the matter is cer-
tainly not beyond argument, and although federal action seems clearly
appropriate to me, it is desirable (very briefly) to mention the reasons
that I find persuasive.
First, and most obviously, we are dealing here with phenomena that
are not only national (or international) in scope, but that have no
primary connection at all in most instances with the state of incorpora-
tion. As we all know, the decision to incorporate in Delaware (or
wherever) is nothing more than a decision on the part of management to
make applicable the company law of that state. Presumably, that law
contains the rules that management wants to operate under, with the
choice quite naturally reflecting a preference for rules that are least
onerous and least likely to impose liabilities and other constraints on
directors and officers. This is not by definition bad or evil. It does,
however, confirm the very well known point that the state of incorpora-
tion has no interest in its charters that is vital to the integrity of its
own policies. People who dwell within its borders are not more inti-
mately affected by its company law than people dwelling
elsewhere -speaking, of course, of public companies-and the lives that
its citizens live, including the privileges and protections they enjoy, are
uninfluenced thereby. In effect, though it sounds legally paradoxical, the
state of incorporation has no significant claim to regulatory power other
than by default of a proper exercise of federal authority. In purely
jurisdictional terms, then, it appears to make no sense whatever for the
laws of state X to govern intracorporate relationships of a firm that has
offices and operations and, even more importantly, has stock and bond-
holders in every state of the Union and perhaps in almost every foreign
country."
" Lorne, Book Review, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1261, 1270 (1980).
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It has been contended by a few, however, that the jurisdiction issue is
not important anyway, and that the virtue of having diverse state com-
pany laws lies precisely in the freedom thereby afforded to companies
to choose the law they wish to live by-and as a corollary, to give in-
vestors the same choice. 5 The capital markets are said to be at work in
all of this. Companies that can give their investors a higher expected
return under the less-confining law of Delaware will want to incorporate
there; those who do better for their shareholders by accepting the
stricter limits of California law will send their charters west. Companies
that fail to "maximize" in this respect will see their shares fall in value
and may be threatened by takeover (assuming, of course, that state law
does not unduly impede takeovers in the first place). Hence, a company
that incorporates in Delaware does so, in effect, because this is really
best for its stockholders. Investors, in turn, will choose those securities
whose issuer's goals are best adapted to their individual portfolio needs.
Presumably, conservative investors will buy shares of companies incor-
porated in California, while those who prefer more risk and less restric-
tive laws will look for Delaware firms. Still others will diversify.
But though interesting and even ingenious, this approach, in my view,
is simply too unrealistic to be taken seriously. Experience and observa-
tion suggest that investors operate on gross (though not unreasonable)
assumptions about how insiders will behave, and that few, if any, in-
vestors- including sophisticated ones-are capable of anticipating deci-
sions like Levien v. Sinclair,'" Cheff v. Mathes,"7 or Barrett v. Denver
Tramways."8 At the least, it would require the most determined and
costly sort of educational process to enable the market to assimilate
those cases into the probabilistic calculation that determines stock
prices. Perhaps one of the reasons for this is that the decisions are
altogether counter-intuitive. Thus, common stockholders expect pro
rata treatment-the investment contract implies as much. They do not
expect valuable corporate opportunities to be taken over by the major-
ity stockholder, and they do not expect corporate assets to be used by
insiders for the purpose of retaining control. Likewise, preferred
stockholders expect to come ahead of common stockholders with respect
to dividends-again, the investment contract seems to say so. They do
not expect their back dividend claims to be eliminated merely because
the common stockholders foresee that profits will presently become
available for distribution, and wish to elbow the preferred stockholders
aside.
" Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corpora-
tion, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
46 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1977).
47 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
" 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1943), aff'd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944).
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Security-holders do indeed expect to be treated "fairly," but they
have no accurate perception about the limits placed on fiduciary conduct
by the states in which their issuers are incorporated, and of course not
one investor in a thousand would be likely to be sure which state that
was. In effect, fiduciary risks are not and probably cannot be an-
ticipated. As to the company's alleged search for a "best" system from
the standpoint of business efficiency, moreover, the relationship be-
tween business goals and rules of fiduciary obligation is remote if it
even exists. While some have argued that corporate managers would
work harder if they were freed of various fiduciary restraints,
49 I
believe that conventional salaries, stock options and other prearranged
bonus plans furnish adequate incentives. Freedom to choose among
available systems of fiduciary regulation relates to the separate self-
interest of the fiduciary - usually his interest in retaining his posi-
tion-and to little else.
It seems virtually self-evident to me that problems that are national
in scope, and that have no unique relationship to the welfare of the
citizens of any particular state, should be solved at the national level.
Equally as obvious, the solutions should be uniform. The participants in
the process-insiders and their advisers, on the one side, and casual in-
vestors on the other-are not equal in their bargaining positions, and
hence the rules of the game need to be established externally. The
customary social advantage of pluralism and "freedom to choose" do not
exist in this context any more now than when the New Deal securities
statutes were enacted. The present diversity of company laws simply
adds up to uncertainty for investors, and very often to surprise and
defeated expectations.
Yet despite my fairly strongly held views on this subject, I would pro-
ceed cautiously and on a step-by-step basis towards the adoption of
federal fiduciary standards. As I have said, the great appeal for me is in
having a chance to solve problems and to do so in specific ways. I am not
really interested in substituting a federal common law of fairness for
state common law. While such a substitution might lead to greater
uniformity, there is no reason to think that it would lead to correct solu-
tions and not much reason to think that the problems would be better
handled than they are now. Once again, I think that specific rules are
needed-rules that lawyers can apply in the planning stage-and if this
approach is taken, it seems reasonable to go forward, but on a limited
basis. As noted, the freezeout area seems to be a promising place to
begin. The issues are well understood, and one would suppose that a
consensus of some sort could now be reached by the experts. There are
plenty of cases on the merger of affiliates; the SEC has in the past few
years devoted much effort to the going private phenomenon and could
19 H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
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undoubtedly make useful legislative proposals at this time. Our
typology of freezeouts is pretty well in hand at present; there has been
extensive debate in the law reviews and elsewhere; and I think many
lawyers and their clients would welcome a resolution of the problem.
Speaking of the SEC, I would not give the agency any more than an
advisory role in respect to the new statute. Enforcement of the new
standards would be through the conventional medium of private law
suits, and the SEC would not be given its customary rule-making
authority. In this respect the new statute (as I conceive it) would have
much less of an administrative component than the present securities
laws. I am not, after all, proposing a disclosure statute -where perhaps
a monitoring authority is necessary-but a "company law," whose en-
forcement and interpretation, like the company laws of the states,
would be left to the courts.
One final, but I think important, observation: Any new federal law in
the fiduciary field should be fully preemptive. This is consistent with
my notion that there are, indeed, correct solutions for fiduciary prob-
lems, and that other solutions, even if apparently more rigorous, should
be barred. State takeover laws are, of course, an obvious illustration.
These laws weight the scales in favor of incumbent management; they
are disruptive -Senator Metzenbaum has called the Ohio law "an
abomination "50-and cannot be justified on investor protection grounds.
The only rational response is federal preemption, and I would take the
same approach in the other areas in which a federal policy is developed.
IV. CONCLUSION
A federal fiduciary act is not the only legislative possibility in the
company law field. A bill calling for outside directors and other uniform
rules for public companies has been proposed by Senator Metzenbaum's
subcommittee; Professor Cary has proposed a minimum standards act;
other reformers have sought to revive the old federal incorporation
idea. I have no great enthusiasm for any of these proposals, as it hap-
pens, but I do not pretend to have analyzed them in detail. It does seem
to me that they are either not ambitious enough, or else go too far in the
direction of federal intervention. By contrast, I think that a cautious
move towards uniform fiduciary standards -after so many years of "ex-
perimentation" at the state level-would be an important and predict-
able, but also a suitably limited, way of improving the nation's company
laws. Litigation, as I have said, is far too active in this field. The need is
for reliable rules of uniform application, and I think we are in a position
now to make a good beginning.
' The Role of the Shareholder in the Corporate World: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 142 (1977). See also Winter, State Law,
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
251, 287-89 (1977).
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